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GEORGE ELIOT, SCIENTIFIC MATERIALISM AND LITERARY FORM: 
SOME REFLECTIONS ON FELICIA BONAPARTE'S WILL AND DESTINY 
By K. M. Newton 
Felicia Bonaparte's study of Eliot's fiction , Will and Destiny: Morali ty and Tragedy in George 
Eliot's Novels , was published in 1975. I read it rather quickly towards the end of the 1970s 
because at the time I was working on a study of Eliot of my own and inevitably my attention 
was somewhat focused on whether there was going to be any overlap with my book. Since 
Bonaparte's book argued strongly that Eliot was intellectually committed to empiricism and 
scientific rationality and mine attempted to bring out her relation to aspects of Romanticism, I 
believed at the time there was little common ground between the two books and I therefore did 
not need to engage seriously with it. Having read Will and Destiny more recently with much 
fuller attention, it now seems to me a major study of Eliot and that this has not been sufficiently 
acknowledged by later critics. Glancing at recommendations for further reading in the many 
editions of Eliot's novels that are currently available, Will and Destiny is seldom listed. 
Bonaparte's later study, The Tryptych and the Cross , which focuses solely on Romola, has 
rightly been widely recognized by critics with a serious interest in that novel as a critical tour 
de force. Will and Destiny should also be an essential critical text for readers of Eliot. 
What has perhaps led to the comparative neglect of Will and Destiny is that Bonaparte , 
one of the most unashamedly intellectual of Eliot's critics , is so unequivocal in identifying her 
with scientific materialism. In the book's Introduction Bonaparte writes: 
It was largely the empiricists, who themselves saw the need for some moral authority, 
who attempted to build a new system out of the new truths , who argued that science was 
not a threat to morality but a new and stronger foundation for what must become modem 
ethics. Eliot too was an empiricist. She too believed that science must be the basis of the 
morality of the future . And, like John Stuart Mill and August Comte, she found in science 
the answer to both relativism and scepticism. For it was science, Eliot held , not God that 
provided an inflexible authority for moral law. ' 
Discussing passages from Daniel Deronda and The Mill on the Floss she writes : 
Two points are of particular importance in these passages . First, the appeal to science -
habitual in all of Eliot's writings - is not merely an explanatory analogy. It is a substantial 
commitment through which Eliot places man [ ... J in the natural order of the universe and 
so asserts the fundamentally material view of man she shared with such ' scientific ' 
thinkers as Mill , Comte, Marx, and others. Secondly, both passages accept scientific 
methodology in that they probe for a principle which will not only explicate the behavior 
revealed in empirical data but will enable the scientist (cosmic or human) to know and 
predict , by 'strict deduction ', that which must of necessity remain beyond observation . It 
is a view, clearly, which adheres most precisely to the evidence of matter and the concept 
of law. (p 50) 
Though this kind of discourse is likely to have alienated many critics and may have played a 
part in Will and Destiny not finding its way onto many reading lists of Eliot criticism , one 
recent critic has sided with Bonaparte's critical perspective. Avrom Fleishman in his book 
George Eliot 's Intellectual Life supports Bonaparte in arguing that Mill is Eliot's major 
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intellectual influence and claims that Bonaparte is Eliot's best critic. What cannot be denied 
about Bonaparte on Eliot is that she applies a fonnidable intelligence to her reading of the 
novels . Much of the book considers in detail particular episodes and characters from the novels 
in highly persuasive readings. Perhaps Fleishman should look again at Will and Destiny since 
his generally negative comments on Adam Bede - 'One cannot regard Adam Bede as a major 
work of fiction, but it establishes a solid foundation for a great career" - receives little support 
from Bonaparte who devotes a good deal of space to it and clearly sees it as one of Eliot's 
major works. When Bonaparte focuses on particular novels in detail, though her intellectual 
perspective is clear, she does not reduce the novels to romans Cl these and even characters who 
critics generally tend to think are not complex enough to deserve detailed critical analysis such 
as Arthur Donnithorne or Fred Vincy are discussed in illuminating tenns, Bonaparte powerfully 
demonstrating how Eliot combines intellectual critique with sympathetic understanding . 
Claiming that Eliot writes from the point of view of scientific materialism is of course 
open to the objection that currents of thought that on the surface do not seem easily 
reconcilable with it can also be found in her writings, such as her admiration for Words worth 
and for aspects at least of the thought of such figures as Carlyle and Ruskin, as well as her 
interest in Judaism, Jewish mysticism and in religion generally. Bonaparte does not ignore this, 
Wordsworth is mentioned as well as the emphasis Eliot places on 'mystery' in some of her 
references to science, though Bonaparte claims that this does not mean that her commitment to 
empiricism and the scientific project is seriously undermined. However, this raises the question 
as to whether Eliot's intellectual perspective is coherent or whether she has an innovative 
intellectual position that is able to integrate apparently opposed elements, and here Bonaparte's 
discussion may fail to convince. 
One might consider Eliot 's relation to detenninism in this context. Bonaparte argues 
that Eliot is fully committed to determinism and entitles one of the sections of her chapter on 
'Destiny', 'Undeviating Law in the Material and Moral World', claiming that it is assumed in 
Eliot's fiction that the 'cosmic scheme [is] governed only by causal laws ' (p. 21). She quotes a 
letter from Eliot to Charles Bray regarding his book, The Philosophy of Necessity , in which she 
agrees with Bray on determinism - 'mind presents itself under the same condition of 
invariableness of antecedent and consequent as all other phenomena' - but one should note that 
she adds a qualification: 'the only difference being that the true antecedent and consequent are 
proportionately difficult to discover as the phenomena are more complex' (p. 48). What Eliot's 
fiction surely shows is that in the human realm at least all phenomena are complex so that there 
is almost never any simple relation between cause and effect, and even in science where the 
testing of hypotheses is done under carefully controlled experimental conditions there is 
always scope for misinterpretation. Bonaparte is not unaware of this complexity and quotes the 
following passage from Chapter 6 of Middlemarch: 
Even with a microscope directed on a water-drop we find ourselves making 
interpretations which turn out to be rather coarse; for whereas under a weak lens you may 
seem to see a creature exhibiting an active voracity into which other smaller creatures 
actively play as if they were so many animated tax-pennies, a stronger lens reveals to you 
certain tiniest hairJets which make vortices for these victims while the swallower waits 
passively at his receipt of custom. (pp. 7-8) 
By implication an even more powerful microscope may make the second interpretation of the 
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water-drop equally coarse , requmng a different metaphor to help comprehend the new 
interpretation . Bonaparte also admits the epistemological limitation of empiricism - 'all 
empirical observation, including science, can never be known to be knowledge of what is but 
only of what is perceived', so that 'Eliot's realism becomes, of necessity, an attempt at 
objectivity that remains within the limits of subjectivity' (p. 11) . 
Bonaparte admits, then, that 'Eliot 's determinism [ ... ] carries considerably more 
complex implications than are suggested by a position such as Bray's [in his Philosophy of 
Necessity]' (p. 50), and she goes on to make an important distinction between actions 'which 
arise in [a character 's] very essence' and those which arise 'only in [a character's] attributive 
nature' (p. 53), the first being qualitatively different from the second. She also claims that for 
Eliot all events considered in empirical terms are equal: 'Not only does every apparent minute 
detail of action acquire special meaning in Eliot, but, more significantly, it is impossible to tell, 
a priori , which event will be more important than another ' (pp . 53-4) . It follows that though a 
character's 'very essence' may shape action, when a character encounters the randomness of 
events one cannot predict with any certainty how that character will act when 'attributive 
nature ' comes into play, since in the situation the character is presented with there will always 
be scope for variability of response in terms of action. Bonaparte does not make this point 
explicitly but it is illustrated powerfully in her discussion ofTito Melema's response in Romola 
to Baldassarre's suddenly confronting him in Florence: 'The surprise of seeing Baldassarre for 
the first time and the fact that the meeting takes place in public allow Tito no opportunity to 
calculate consequences. When Lorenzo asks who the strange man might be, Tito replies 
instantly, "Some madman, surely'" (p .153). As Bonaparte points out, Tito later believes it 
would have been less of a risk to have recognized Baldassarre: 'Events prove his second 
thoughts right' (p.l54) . Yet is she right in implying that if Tito had had more time to reflect he 
could have calculated the consequences correctly and so would have behaved differently? I 
think this is where her determinism oversimplifies the situation. Determinism can be no 
reliable guide to future circumstances since there are too many variables. At the point 
Baldassarre confronts him, Tito cannot know what action would serve his interests best. To use 
Bonaparte's terminology, Tito 's 'very essence' is his devotion to self-interest and his own 
pleasure but that cannot determine how, in terms of his 'attributive nature', he should act in 
specific situations as events arise unpredictably and he has to decide how to act without 
knowing whether the consequences of a particular action will serve his interests better than an 
alternative action . Before he acts he has the power to shape reality in different ways but once 
he has acted, a reality is created that is now unalterable. This is a point that Bonaparte rightly 
stresses: 'in a character's intentions [ ... ] we see perhaps subtler, truer motives. Yet the events 
of the novels arise in actions, not in intentions , a fact which many readers find disagreeable in 
Eliot [ .. . ] . It is [ .. . ] the very core of her convictions that intentions and motives , like hopes and 
wishes , have no consequences , do not, cannot, have consequences ' (p. 34). 
Every person performs actions that could have been different, given that there is always 
the potential for some degree of variability of response in regard to action in any situation. The 
action that is performed will have consequences, and these consequences will create other 
situations in which variability of response comes into play before another action takes place, 
and so on ad infinitum. Such complexity makes determinism of limited value for Eliot in 
understanding the effect of actions at the human level whatever its value in the realm of science 
where great effort is made to control variability. This does not mean that determinism has no 
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significant role in Eliot's fiction but her novels habitually show that in the human context the 
consequences of an action generally cannot be determined by a single cause, the corollary of 
which is that one cannot predict with any certainty that any action or decision will necessarily 
result in a particular set of consequences. In Romola Tito's action in refusing to recognize 
Baldassarre does not inevitably lead to his ruin - numerous other factors play a part - but if he 
had chosen to seek reconciliation with Baldassarre this would have contributed to creating an 
alternative reality to the one in which he ends up being murdered by Baldassarre. An example 
of there being a determining cause of a character's ruin which is not sufficient in itself to 
account for that ruin is Lydgate's vote for Tyke in Middlemarch. This links him to Bulstrode in 
people's minds, a link that is crucial in his being implicated in the death of Raffles . Yet a whole 
network of causes and consequences have to be taken into account in addition to Lydgate's vote 
for Tyke in order to lead eventually to the accusations that end his career in Middlemarch and 
the hospital project. Among the most obvious are the blackmailing of Bulstrode by Raffles, 
Lydgate's arrogance which alienates influential people, the prejudices and fears of other 
doctors who have a motive for believing anything that would result in his leaving 
Middlemarch, his marriage to Rosamond Vincy which places him seriously in debt so that he 
is eventually forced to seek financial support from Bulstrode, and one could list many 
seemingly less obvious factors that play a part in his ruin. The novel may give special emphasis 
to the vote for Tyke as the apparent origin of his ultimate failure but that emphasis does not 
imply that this event had more intrinsic importance than other events or actions that also 
contribute to his failure - so Bonaparte is right that 'it is impossible to tell, a priori, which 
event will be more important than another' - but it is inevitable that human beings will see 
certain events as more important and significant than others in relation to their interests, beliefs, 
or prejudices. The narrative the narrator creates is influenced by interests and a philosophical 
perspective that shape its construction. A complex structure of events is created in relation to 
Lydgate's failure, one which gives special emphasis to his vote for Tyke, and though there is 
no direct and simple link between that action and Lydgate's failure, one can infer from the 
narrator's highlighting of the vote for Tyke that a different reality would have emerged if he 
had not voted for Tyke, one in which he may not have been implicated in Raffles's death and 
in which he may not have had to leave Middlemarch. 
The interpretation of reality that is embodied in the narrative is of course interesting in 
itself and particularly relevant to the ethical and political themes of Middlemarch but there is 
an implied subtext that suggests there is an infmity of potential realities, a subtext that 
undermines conventional positivist empiricism with its emphasis on causality and 
consequence. If there is a weakness in Bonaparte's treatment of determinism it is that cause and 
consequence are not sufficiently subject to scrutiny - she argues that 'characters who commit 
their fortunes to chance [ ... ] ignore [ ... ] the factual world in which events occur only within 
the scope of cause and consequence' (p. 16) - but not sufficient account is taken of variability 
of response always being theoretically present before any action takes place, with 
consequences not being able to be reliably calculated. There is thus always some degree of 
gambling intrinsic in any action in relation to its intended effect. In discussing the role of 
chance in Eliot, Bonaparte writes that there is an 'assumption [ ... ] that Eliot could trace, had 
she fictional world enough and time, a long chain of causes and effects which would make 
these events in question [chance events] as naturally inevitable as others in the novels' (p. 41). 
I think, however, Eliot would consider that a futile exercise since multiple causes and effects 
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will produce a web (to use Eliot 's most famous metaphor) of such infinite complexity that 
understanding the totality of relations between causes and effects is beyond human 
comprehension. Chance is thus an ineradicable human concept and gambling an inevitability, 
and though her narrator may express moral disapproval of gambling as a life strategy, it is also 
clear that gamblers sometimes improbably win. 
Does Eliot or more exactly her narrator, however, generally rig things so that a 
narrative structure is created in which, for example, characters such as Tito or Grandcourt are 
punished by how events turn out? This leads to the question of whether artistic organisation in 
Eliot's fiction is at odds with empiricism. One of the most interesting aspects of Bonaparte's 
argument in Will and Destiny is that, though she recognizes that for the artist subjectivity 
cannot be overcome, she detects discordance between Eliot's scientific materialism and the 
methods and techniques she applies to realise her artistic and moral aims as a novelist. 
Bonaparte believes Eliot as artist was committed to representing the world in empiricist terms , 
banishing distorting subjectivity as far as possible: 'Precisely because subjectivity threatens 
always to question the truth of the artist's vision, experience must be refined and adjusted by 
knowledge, itself founded on experience but now reflected on formally and analytically[ ... ] . 
For there can be no doubt that Eliot was a thorough empiricist [ ... ] like Mill [ ... ] arguing 
against any criterion of truth whose basis is not in solid fact' (p. 5). Yet Bonaparte in a section 
of her chapter on 'Destiny' , entitled 'Loose Threads in the Causal Web', believes Eliot's 
empiricism is compromised in her fiction and she attributes that to Eliot 's need to employ 
artistic methods to incorporate her moral perspective within the narrative. 
It seems odd that, though Bonaparte refers to Hume in relation to Eliot - 'Gordon 
Haight dismisses far too lightly [ ... ] the insight that George Eliot's novels "seem to have been 
dictated to a plain woman of genius by the ghost of David Hume'" (p. 5) - that she appears not 
to take account of one of Hume's most cited ideas: the unbridgeable dichotomy between fact 
and value when she claims 'that science was not a threat to morality but a new and stronger 
foundation for what must become modern ethics' (p. xxii). She sees Eliot in her fiction 
confronting 'the existential , absurd universe [ . . . ] a tragic universe in which man is born and 
dies for no purpose and with little hope for joy' (p. viii), and claims that Eliot is right to believe 
that empiricism and science can somehow on their own provide the foundation for a morality 
that will be independent of religion or metaphysics and can overcome relativism and 
scepticism. Despite Eliot's support for science and a methodology based on empiricism, 
Bonaparte 's claim that for Eliot they were sufficient in themselves to supply the basis of moral 
law is open to doubt. For example, though Eliot accepted the scientific validity of Darwinian 
theory, she rejected the claim that its governing principle, 'survival of the fittest', in Spencer's 
formulation, could provide the basis for ethical action at the individual or social level. 
Bonaparte is critical of aspects of Eliot's fiction that cannot be reconciled with 
empiricism: 'There are elements of melodrama which cannot be satisfactorily explained [ ... ] 
especially in the matter of causality. Why Eliot devised these and thought them - as she must 
have - appropriate, or at least not inappropriate, must make a list of futile guesses' (p. 42). In 
'Loose Threads in the Causal Web ' , Bonaparte argues that it is artistic pressures that lead to the 
setting aside of empiricism since the artistic organization of her narratives implies there is a 
moral order in the world that tends to benefit the morally deserving and generally, if not 
always, punishes or frustrates the undeserving . For Bonaparte this is not reconcilable with 
scientific materialism, since a 'deus ex machina' appears to intrude into 'the plots of events' 
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and so that there is 'a striking contradiction to Eliot's fundamental principle of action' (p. 36) . 
Daniel Deronda is particularly problematic in this respect: 
In Deronda especially, Eliot seems to go beyond the possible and the probable. Here, the 
reader is troubled by many questions . Why, for instance, is it Daniel who happens to find 
Mirah as she is about to commit suicide, an incident which leads him to the preparation 
of his own long-delayed destiny? Why does it happen that Mordecai is Mirah 's brother? 
Why is it that Ezra Cohen, whom Daniel believes to be Mirah's brother, is not but 
happens to employ the man who is? (pp. 36-7) 
Bonaparte is inclined to be forgiving of Eliot for this use of 'coincidences' but sees the problem 
as lying with literary form which Eliot as an artist inevitably employs , so that Grandcourt's 
drowning 'at so appropriate a moment' is a 'coincidence' , but one foreshadowed in the text. 
Though Bonaparte understands why Eliot as a novelist might not want to abandon such a 
crucial literary device even if it is in contradiction with an empirical view of reality, the 
discordance between her philosophical commitment and her artistic practice needs to be 
acknowledged: ' foreshadowing is an aesthetic device which can hardly expect to find 
realization in the real world which Eliot's fiction promises to mirror. The reader 's doubt 
persists ' (pp . 37-8) . 
Another reason Bonaparte cites to account for events like the drowning of Grandcourt 
that she finds inappropriate in terms of empiricism is that they are 'thematically motivated' (p. 
38) and she points out that sometimes symbolism also appears to be necessary: 'Yet even such 
deflections from literal fact do not offer Eliot all the scope she sometimes requires. Very often 
we find Eliot compelled - or thinking she is compelled , which yields an identical consequence 
- to communicate not only on the literal level but on one or more symbolic levels ' (pp . 38-9). 
In Si/as Mamer , she argues , there are two levels which must be kept apart, 'the factually 
realistic and the mythically true level; and each demands a different set of rules . It is essential 
not to take the myth for the fact ' (p. 39). But this creates incoherence: 'one of the novel's major 
theses concerns the causal relationship itself, demonstrated on the literal level by the events 
which occur mainly in Godfrey Cass's life, but demonstrated on the mythical level in symbols 
which , if taken literally, deny the very hypotheses they are designed to enforce' (p . 39) . 
Bonaparte goes on to argue that it is understandable that 'more and more, Eliot turned to the 
refuge of symbolic endings' (p. 41), since endings can have no empirical justification in reality: 
' the world continues [ .. . ] in pretty much the way it had before' (p . 41). 
Other critics have raised the same problem in relation to Eliot and her plots but none 
has articulated it as powerfully as Bonaparte , together with an attempt to understand why it 
exists rather than simply to accuse Eliot of failing to resolve a contradiction: 'In plot, she never 
found a structure that suitably expressed her very unique vision at all points . Thus the content 
of Eliot's novels is often revolutionary, modem, the form, not always ' (pp. 42-3) . It is hard to 
believe, however, that Eliot would not have been aware of this apparent mismatch between 
literary form and empirical content and not have attempted to overcome it. Otherwise one 
might have to resist Bonaparte's claim that Eliot writes from the point of view of a scientific 
materialist, or alternatively that Bonaparte's understanding of the form of her novels and its 
relation to the empirical is based on questionable assumptions. Some Eliot critics may prefer 
to take the former view since it allows them to set aside Bonaparte's claim that Eliot was a 
' thorough empiricist' and thus open up her fiction to alternative readings. But though as I 
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suggested previously a great range of ideas circulate in Eliot 's texts I think Bonaparte is right 
to see empiricism as central to Eliot's realism and I will therefore argue that she misreads the 
form of Eliot's fiction . 
Bonaparte makes what may seem an unexceptionable point: 'Eliot makes a clear 
distinction between what is true and what is literal. In cases such as the drowning of 
Grandcourt, it seems fairly obvious that the literal recorder of facts must be in conflict with the 
analytic commentator on them' (p. 38). I quoted previously Bonaparte's comment: 'Eliot's 
realism becomes, of necessity, an attempt at objectivity that remains within the limits of 
subjectivity' (p. 11), drawing obviously on Kant, but the conflict Bonaparte sees between the 
'literal facts' the narrator records and the subjectivity of the narrator is problematic . This is to 
treat Eliot's form of narration as essentially similar to third person narration in conventional 
fiction where the 'literal facts' are assumed to exist separately from the narrator who merely 
describes them or comments on them. But if 'objectivity [ ... ] remains within the limits of 
subjectivity' such a separation is called into question, and I shall argue that the form of Eliot's 
narration undermines such a separation . Her narrator is characterized as a historical novelist 
writing about events that have already happened and that are real for the narrator. A narrative 
structure is formed out of such events with the narrator using the techniques available to a 
novelist in shaping and commenting on them. Reality is still made up of 'literal facts ' but by 
being mediated through the mind of the narrator as novelist who has certain interests , 
particularly ethical and political in nature , reality is a fusion of the objective and the subjective. 
Though 'literal facts ' have an independent existence, they are accessed via the subjectivity of 
the narrator. Nor do Eliot's narrators pretend they are neutral observers or describers of an 
independent reality made up of 'literal facts'; their subjectivity is on display through numerous 
interventions and expressions of opinion . The narrators interpret the events, situations and 
people they are concerned with not only as conventional historians but also as novelists, their 
interpretations exploiting the devices of fiction , such as foreshadowing , a 'thematically 
motivated' connecting of events, use of symbolism in order to go beyond 'literal facts' and 
communicate at a different level which generates a range of possible meanings . Though the 
narrative may consist of 'literal facts' and descriptive detail , these are integrated into a literary 
form which incorporates a commentary that may be ironical, sceptical, pessimistic, idealistic, 
so that the reality that is represented is complex and multi-faceted. Thus description , 
interpretation, critical comment, along with the appeal to the senses that is associated with 
artistic form and expression, constantly interact. To refer as Bonaparte does to the 
'unlikelihood of some events' is to read a novel like Deronda as if 'literal facts' and empirical 
events exist independently and not within a narrative shaped by the narrator. There is no 'deus 
ex machina' who 'intrudes into "the plots of events'" but only a narrator as novelist who shapes 
events to serve both a thematic and an aesthetic purpose; it is no 'coincidence' that drowning 
recurs in the text of Deronda, with Grandcourt's drowning being ' foreshadowed ' ; this linking 
is created by the narrator as novelist and artist. 'Factual' events such as the drowning 
nevertheless retain their empirical independence and are thus open to being interpreted 
differently. 
Of course this implies that the narrator should not be identified with Eliot as author, a 
standard assumption by many previous critics . Her novels rather have ' implied authors' with 
the narrator being within the narrative and a major structural element of it. The implied author 
functions as a frame which surrounds the narrative though not of course intended to be 
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specifically present in the text, in effect functioning as what Jacques Derrida calls a 'parergon' ,3 
incidentally a word Eliot uses in the plural in Chapter 29 of Middlemarch. I would argue that 
this gives the reader some scope to interpret things differently from the narrator while still 
respecting the narrator's point of view. Narrators can also enter the minds of characters 
seemingly independently of the narrator through the literary technique of free indirect speech, 
though there is no metaphysical but only imaginative penetration. I believe this analysis 
overcomes the contradiction Bonaparte sees as an inevitable consequence of the disjunction 
between Eliot's empiricism and the morally motivated structuring of reality implied by the 
novelistic methods and techniques she employs, nor is there any indication that empirical 
events have an intrinsic meaning or a moral structure in themselves. Though Bonaparte 
recognizes that realism can never be purely and objectively empiricist since subjectivity cannot 
be completely eliminated, she does not draw the same conclusion that Eliot, I believe, draws 
from it, that art can combine realism grounded in empiricism with an ethical dimension 
mediated through art even if empiricism is ethically neutral or indifferent. By being committed 
both to empiricism and to art, I would suggest that Eliot believes the realist novel in her 
conception of it has the potential to exploit its literary and artistic power to overcome Hume's 
dichotomy between fact and value, or empiricism and the ethical. 
In the last chapter of Will and Destiny, 'Morality and Tragedy', Bonaparte ties to find 
a way of overcoming the problem that Eliot's ethical aims in her fiction seem to require that 
empiricism be set aside and improbabilities and 'coincidences' be resorted to. She claims that 
integration can be seen to work in practice if one regards the narration as consisting in effect 
of two narrators or '[t]wo narrative voices' who exist 'in an irresolvable tension' (p. 182) with 
each other: 'There is, first, an analytic narrator who explicates, with neutral accuracy, the facts 
of existence [ ... ]. He is nonpartisan [ ... ] objective [ ... ] outside the experience of the characters 
[ ... ] uninvolved', thus viewing reality purely empirically. 'The second narrator, quite different 
in tone, is subjective [ ... ] because he enters fully into the exjstence of every character' (p. 163), 
thus creating the sympathetic consciousness that is intrinsic to the moral dimension of Eliot's 
fiction. The second narrator 'knows with that knowledge that comes from total identification, 
the final and unquestionable validity of the egocentric view [ ... ] he justifies the self against all 
encroachments [ ... ]. But against the objective and analytic narrator, whose exclusive right it is 
to record the movement of destiny, the subjective narrator is as powerless as the characters 
themselves against the pressure of compelling facts' (pp. 163-4). While the analytic narrator is 
ruthlessly objective about human beings blind to the reality of the human situation, the 
subjective narrator urges sympathy even if they may have few redeeming features, as is evident 
in the following passage Bonaparte quotes from Chapter 17 of Adam Bede: 
everyone, must be accepted as they are; you can neither straighten their noses, nor 
brighten their wit, nor rectify their dispositions; and it is these people - amongst whom 
your life is passed - that it is needful you should tolerate, pity, and love; it is these more 
or less ugly, stupid, inconsistent people, whose movements of goodness you should 
admire - for whom you should cherish all possible hopes, all possible patience. (171) 
But Bonaparte's creation of two narrative voices is only an expedient to try to overcome the 
fact that in reality there is only one narrator who is equally committed both to empiricism with 
its basis in rationality and objectivity, and to a form of ethics with its basis in sympathy. Such 
sympathy has no credibility and becomes sentimentality if it ignores the perspective of the 
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analytic narrator, but the division of the narrator into two voices is a consequence of 
Bonaparte's misreading of the form of Eliot's novels , as I have tried to argue. However, this 
misreading does not prevent many insightful readings by Bonaparte of particular characters 
and situations, which are as evident in the final chapter of the study as in earlier ones. These 
readings together with the fact that Bonaparte raises theoretical questions in relation to Eliot 
that still need to be engaged with makes Will and Destiny necessary reading for any serious 
student of her fiction. 
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